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Abstract 
This paper examines how the analysis of inflation targeting (IT) adoption is affected by the 
choice of the analyzed period. We test whether country characteristics influence the decision to 
apply IT differently before and after its adoption, using panel probit models for 60 countries 
over the period 1985-2008. Our findings suggest that there is a structural change after IT 
adoption, as the factors leading to adoption of IT differ significantly from those leading to its 
continuation. Thus, including the post-adoption period when estimating the factors of IT 
adoption leads to biased results when interested in the question as of why countries adopt IT.  
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1. Introduction 
Inflation targeting (IT) is a monetary policy strategy that involves the public announcement of 
numerical medium-term targets for inflation and strong commitment of the central bank to 
achieving price stability. By the end of 2011, 31 countries had implemented IT. Due to the 
increasing popularity of IT, it is important to know what drives countries to its adoption. 
Several studies analyze empirically the factors leading to IT choice (e.g., Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001; Hu, 2006; Mukherjee and Singer, 2008). However, their methodological 
approach does not differentiate between the factors of IT adoption and the factors of IT 
continuation; as a result, they simultaneously examine both. These studies commonly use the 
full sample for estimation, i.e., keep observations before and after adoption, until the end of the 
analyzed period. Such data treatment may cause endogeneity and asymmetry problems, leading 
to biased results.  
This paper examines how the analysis of IT adoption is affected by this choice of the 
analyzed period. We apply panel probit models on the dataset of Samarina and de Haan (2013) 
and test whether IT adoption constitutes a structural change, as a result of which country 
characteristics influence the choice of IT differently before and after its adoption.  
When analyzing the decision to apply or not to apply IT at a specific moment in time, one 
should take into account which monetary policy strategy a country has so far used (IT or non-
IT). To put it differently, the decision to switch from non-IT to IT might not be symmetric to the 
decision to switch from IT to non-IT. It seems to be institutionally and politically easier to 
switch from non-IT to IT than vice versa. Hence, we cannot model this process symmetrically. 
Indeed, the asymmetry is present in real life as we do not observe (at least up to now) any 
transition from IT to an alternative monetary policy strategy. So far, none of the IT countries has 
been forced to abandon it. Thus, once a country adopts IT, the self-reinforcing mechanisms 
make IT endogenous and persistent (see Section 2 for further discussion).  
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In line with this, our empirical findings indeed suggest that the decision to apply IT is 
different from the decision to maintain IT. The factors related to IT differ significantly between 
the pre- and post-adoption periods, indicating that IT adoption creates a structural change in 
institutional and economic characteristics of a country. Most notably, the effect of inflation on 
the probability of IT adoption is largely overestimated in the model including the post-adoption 
period compared to the one without this period. Thus, using the full sample (i.e., including the 
post-adoption period) for analyzing IT adoption leads to biased parameter estimates. This bias 
causes an overstatement of the importance of variables that are pushed by the actual 
implementation of IT. Such an approach, used in previous studies of IT adoption, led the authors 
to overly strong conclusions.  
2. Theoretical framework 
IT is proved to be a durable and persistent monetary policy strategy. In over 20 years of its 
existence, no country has been forced to give it up.1 The possible reason for the high durability 
of IT is its endogeneity. As an explanation of this endogeneity, we refer to the literature on 
Optimum Currency Areas (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Rose, 2000). In such studies it is argued that 
countries are more likely to satisfy the criteria for entry into a currency union ex post than ex 
ante. That is, even if a currency union is not an optimal choice for a country at the point of its 
accession, the process of economic and trade integration will transform the economic 
fundamentals and institutions in such a way that a currency union becomes an optimal regime 
after all. Consequently, given the self-reinforcing mechanisms and on top of that the asymmetry 
                                                        
1 Note that three EU members (Finland, Spain, and Slovakia) abandoned IT when they joined the euro area. 
However, this decision was not caused by unsatisfactory economic results, but rather by the institutional 
commitment of countries to adopt the euro and to unify their monetary policy conduct with the ECB. Thus, their 
choice to abandon IT was politically predetermined and can be considered as an exception. Additionally, although 
these EMU countries gave up explicit IT, their new monetary policy strategy under the ECB framework resembles 
implicit IT and might in the future be transformed into a formal IT strategy (Rose, 2007). 
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in political consequences, it becomes more difficult and costly to exit a currency union than to 
stay in.   
Similar mechanisms may be at work for IT. Although some countries do not satisfy initial 
conditions for IT adoption, they may choose to apply IT anyway in a belief of its effectiveness 
in controlling inflation. Once IT is in place, country characteristics and institutions subsequently 
develop in a way that supports the IT framework. As institutions adjust to functioning under IT, 
it reinforces the decision of the central bank to maintain IT, making it an endogenously 
determined optimal choice. In this situation, abandoning IT becomes more difficult than keeping 
this strategy. The decision to give up IT after years of its implementation may undermine the 
credibility of the central bank and destabilize inflation expectations.  
Given the endogeneity of IT, there is an asymmetry in the monetary strategy choice. That 
is, the (importance of) factors influencing the decision to continue or exit IT are likely to be 
different from those affecting the decision to adopt or not adopt IT. This asymmetry is caused 
by a structural change during and after IT adoption. Ignoring the asymmetry and structural 
change leads to biased estimation results and inadequate statistical inference.  
Therefore, we test the hypothesis: 
IT adoption creates a structural change in economic and institutional conditions. As a result, 
the factors driving IT adoption are different from those leading to IT continuation. 
Special attention in this analysis is given to inflation, which is considered to be the most 
important factor driving IT adoption. Previous studies find that lower inflation increases the 
probability to adopt IT (see Samarina and de Haan, 2013). At the same time, the implementation 
of IT helps to maintain low inflation. As inflation after IT adoption is affected by the use of this 
strategy, it becomes an endogenous variable. Ignoring this endogeneity could lead to the 
overstatement of the importance of inflation. Thus, we expect that the effect of inflation on the 
 5
probability of IT adoption is overestimated in the model that does not distinguish between the 
pre- and post-adoption periods. 
3. Methodology 
The study employs a panel binary choice model where the dependent variable  takes the value 
1 if country i implements IT in year t, and 0 otherwise. We use a probit specification and 
estimate two types of models: (i) random effects probit to account for unobserved cross-country 
heterogeneity; (ii) pooled probit with standard errors clustered at the country level to control for 
serial correlation across time.2 The estimation is conducted by Maximum Likelihood. 
To test whether the explanatory variables influence the probability of IT choice differently 
before and after IT adoption, we employ a structural break analysis. Let  be a time function, 
where  measures the duration of IT in years, starting from 0 in the adoption year. The 
unrestricted model has the form:  
Prob  1,,, ,   Φ  ,    ,    ,	       (1) 




is an unobserved latent variable which describes 
the decision to adopt IT; $.  is a cdf of a standard normal distribution; α 
 
is a constant term; 
β, ,  are vectors of parameters to be estimated; , is a matrix of explanatory variables, 
lagged one year, as current decisions of central banks rely on the history of analyzed factors; 
,   is a matrix of interaction terms between the explanatory variables and ;	 
are random effects, uncorrelated with the regressors, |,, ~(0, )*+.  
Given that the adjustment of country characteristics to IT implementation is a gradual 
process, we introduce  as a smooth transition function. Such specification takes into 
                                                        
2
 We do not estimate a fixed effects model for two reasons. First, there is no fixed effects probit estimator. Second, 
fixed effects logit drops the entire control group, i.e., all countries that did not adopt IT. For this reason, a fixed 
effects model has not been used in previous studies of IT adoption either.  
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account the fact that it may take more than one year to accommodate the economic conditions 
and institutions so as to be compatible with the IT framework. For 	 ! 0,  is specified as: 
1)	  ,-//; 0 1 0, 0 is a decay parameter; larger 0 means a slower transition; 
2)   1 2 ,3/4; 6 ! 0, 6 is a speed of transition; smaller 6 implies a slower transition.  
During the estimation, we will use both specifications of  to examine the sensitivity of 
results to the choice of the smoothing function.  
For the pre-adoption period,   0 and   0, the estimated parameters for the 
explanatory variables correspond to vector β. For the post-adoption period,  ! 0 and  ! 0, 
the estimated parameters are β , , and . 
The restricted model has the form:  
Prob  1,,   Φ  ,  .               (3) 
The estimation procedure is the following: first we estimate the restricted model; then, we 
fit the unrestricted model with different specifications of  and use a Wald test to test for the 
joint significance of the interaction terms and . Testing for a structural break implies the 
following null and alternative hypotheses: 
78:	there is no structural break, i.e. all interaction terms with  plus  itself have jointly 
insignificant coefficient estimates;  
7:	there is a structural break after IT adoption, i.e. either the coefficient of  or at least one 
of the interaction terms are significantly different from zero. 
4. Data  
We use the dataset of Samarina and de Haan (2013). It consists of 60 countries over the period 
1985-2008, out of which 30 countries have implemented IT and 30 countries did not. Table A1 
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in the Annex provides the list of countries with IT adoption dates. We conduct estimations for 
official adoption dates according to the central banks’ documents.3  
The dataset includes 12 explanatory variables associated with IT choice, namely: inflation, 
output growth, output volatility, exchange rate regime, exchange rate volatility, fiscal balance, 
government debt, trade openness, external debt, market-based financial structure, financial 
development, and an index for actual central bank instrument independence (ACBI 
independence). These variables are analyzed in previous studies as potential factors leading to 
IT adoption (e.g., Hu, 2006; Mukherjee and Singer, 2008). First, we include those 6 explanatory 
variables that are found significant by Samarina and de Haan (2013). These are: inflation, output 
volatility, flexible exchange rate regime dummy, exchange rate volatility, government debt, and 
financial development. Subsequently, we extend the model and examine all 12 variables. Table 
A2 (Annex) describes the explanatory variables.  
5. Empirical results 
Table 1 presents the estimation results for random effects probit models. The results for pooled 
probit models are reported in Table A3 (Annex). First, we fit the model with 6 and then with 12 
explanatory variables. We report average partial effects at ̅  0 for random effects probit and 
(in Table A3) average marginal effects for pooled probit models. In the transition function  
we set 0 and 6 equal to 1, which implies a transition half-life (i.e. when D(τ) = 0.5) of 17 
months and 10 months, respectively. 
The Wald test statistics indicate that all interaction terms with  plus  itself are 
jointly significant in the unrestricted models. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative that there is a structural break after IT adoption.  
                                                        
3 The estimation results using alternative adoption dates for soft IT and full-fledged IT are qualitatively similar 
and available on request. 
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Our results point to substantial differences between restricted and unrestricted models in 
terms of significance and magnitude of the marginal/partial effects for the explanatory variables. 
In the unrestricted models we find significant but smaller effects (in an absolute sense) for 
inflation, exchange rate regime, exchange rate volatility, and financial development.4 Especially 
noteworthy is the finding that in the unrestricted models the estimated effects of inflation are 
substantially different from the restricted models, pointing to a large overestimation bias in the 
latter. This result is in line with our argument that the impact of inflation on the decision to 
apply IT changes noticeably after IT adoption. Furthermore, in random effects probit the 
estimates of government debt turn significant in the unrestricted models, whereas output 
volatility, trade openness, external debt, and market-based financial structure become 
insignificant. The remaining variables do not show noticeable changes.  The results for the 
pooled probit models are comparable to the ones for the random effects probit models.  
Since we cannot estimate 0	and	6	directly, we conduct a robustness analysis to check how 
sensitive the results are to the choice of 0	and	6. Figures 1 and 2 show the estimated effects 
across different values of 0	and	6, respectively, that are used to measure half-lives of transition. 
In Figure 1 the half-life of transition varies from 3.5 months (i.e. 0  0.2) to 69 months (i.e. 
0  4), while in Figure 2 the half-life of transition varies from 45 months (i.e. 6  0.05) to 6 
months (i.e. 6  3). We show the graphs for models including 6 explanatory variables (the 
results using 12 variables are comparable and available on request). We find that the outcomes – 
with the exception of inflation – do not vary substantially across 0 and 6 in terms of sign and 
significance of the estimated effects. For inflation, the estimated effects become much smaller 
(in absolute value) as transition is allowed to go faster. Moreover and as to be expected, the 
slower is the transition to IT (corresponding to a higher half-life of transition), the closer our 
                                                        
4
 The only exceptions are financial development and exchange rate variables in the unrestricted random effects 
probit specification with 12 explanatory variables. As compared to the restricted model, the estimated effects turn 
out somewhat larger in an absolute sense. 
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estimates get to the restricted model. However, even for a very slow transition, the results from 
the unrestricted models remain significantly different from the restricted.  
  
Table 1. Estimation results – random effects probit 
Variables Restricted  Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted 















 (1.050) (0.209) (0.190) (0.314) (0.374) (0.362) 
Output volatility -0.006* 0.0005 0.0005 -0.003* 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.094*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.034** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 (0.035) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) 
Exchange rate volatility 0.015* 0.013** 0.012*** 0.008* 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Government debt 0.001 -0.001* -0.001* -0.0003 -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Financial development 0.118** -0.033 -0.032 -0.058** -0.069** -0.066** 
 (0.050) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.035) (0.034) 
Output growth    0.0001 -0.005 -0.004 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Fiscal balance    -0.002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trade openness     0.002*** 0.0001 0.0001 
    (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
External debt    0.0002** -0.00002 -0.00004 
    (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Market-based financial structure    -0.089*** 0.004 0.003 
    (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) 
ACBI independence     -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Observations 1009 1009 1009 809 809 809 
Log-likelihood -240.0 -135.0 -128.6 -179.7 -100.7 -98.9 
Wald test p-value   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Notes: The Table reports average partial effects and their standard errors (in parentheses). Interaction terms are 
included in the unrestricted models, but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate the significance on 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. Wald test p-value indicates the significance level for rejecting the null hypothesis of joint 
insignificance of interaction terms and . 
 
The comparison between the restricted and unrestricted models shows that using the 
assumption that the factors explaining IT adoption do not depend upon the running regime is 
rejected by the data. Studies that rely on this assumption tend to overestimate the effects of 
crucial economic factors, such as inflation, exchange rate regime, financial development, fiscal 
discipline, and trade openness on the probability of countries to start adopting IT (see e.g., Hu, 
2006; Mukherjee and Singer, 2008).  
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Figure 1.  Average partial/marginal effects for BC  DE/C 
          
 
   
Figure 2.  Average partial/marginal effects for BC  F 2 DGCH 
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To conclude, we find evidence of a structural change after IT adoption. Moreover, the 
effects of explanatory variables on the probability of IT adoption are in an absolute sense 
overestimated when we include the post-adoption period. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine how the selection of the time period affects the analysis of IT adoption 
and test whether country characteristics influence the probability to use IT differently before and 
after adoption. We find that there is a structural change in economic and institutional 
characteristics occurring during and after IT adoption. The factors leading to IT adoption differ 
significantly between the periods before and after adoption due to the asymmetry and 
endogeneity of IT. Importantly, the effect of inflation on the probability of IT adoption is largely 
overestimated in the model including the post-adoption period. Hence, using the full sample for 
analyzing the determinants of IT adoption produces biased parameter estimates. Excluding all 
the observations after the IT adoption date eliminates this bias.  
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Table A1. List of countries with IT adoption dates 
IT countries (30) 
Armenia  
Australia 


























































Non-IT countries (30) 
Austria  
Belgium                     
Denmark  
France 
Germany                    








Argentina                                        
















Sources: Samarina and de Haan (2013) 
  
Table A2. Variables and their description  
  Analyzed factor Description of variable 







Output growth GDP growth rate  
Output volatility Annual standard deviation of monthly Industrial Production growth rates 
Flexible exchange rate regime 1 – floating exchange rate regime, 0 - otherwise 
Exchange rate volatility  Annual standard deviation of monthly percentage changes in REER  
Fiscal balance Fiscal surplus (in % GDP) 
Government debt  Central government debt (in % GDP) 
Trade openness  Sum of export and import (in % GDP) 
External exposure  External debt (in % GDP) 
Financial development Private credit by banks and other financial institutions/GDP 
Market-based financial structure 1 – market-based financial system, 0 – bank-based financial system 
ACBI independence  Actual index = legal indexrule of law 
Legal index: 1 - central bank is instrument independent, 0 – otherwise 





Table A3. Estimation results –pooled probit 
Variables Restricted  Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted 















 (0.652) (0.146) (0.131) (0.926) (0.180) (0.175) 
Output volatility -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.236*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.258*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
 (0.058) (0.016) (0.016) (0.061) (0.016) (0.016) 
Exchange rate volatility 0.055*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.060*** 0.009** 0.009** 
 (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.004) 
Government debt -0.002 -0.001** -0.001** -0.002 -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Financial development -0.082 -0.032* -0.030* -0.154* -0.046** -0.045** 
 (0.080) (0.019) (0.018) (0.092) (0.019) (0.018) 
Output growth    -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
    (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fiscal balance    0.014 0.002 0.002 
    (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trade openness     -0.0003 0.00001 0.00003 
    (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
External debt    0.0003 -0.00001 -0.00001 
    (0.005) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Market-based financial structure    0.047 0.016 0.015 
    (0.084) (0.016) (0.016) 
ACBI independence     -0.00001 -0.0003 -0.001 
    (0.017) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 1009 1009 1009 809 809 809 
Log-likelihood -468.8 -139.8 -132.2 -396.1 -104.4 -101.9 
Wald test p-value   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Notes: The Table reports average marginal effects and their robust standard errors (in parentheses). Interaction 
terms are included in unrestricted models, but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate the significance on 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. Wald test p-value indicates the significance level for rejecting the null hypothesis of joint 
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